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This study is the first to estimate mothers’ marginal willingness to pay (MWP) for job amenities 
directly. Its identification strategy relies on German maternity leave length. The key aspect of the 
maternal leave framework is that mothers can decide whether and when to return to their guaranteed 
job.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies  that  analyze  the  job  search  of  employed  workers,  this 
framework allows us to overcome the limitation of not observing the wage/amenity offer process. A 
theoretical model of the leave length decision is derived from a random utility approach. Using data 
from  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  and  the  Qualification  and  Career  Survey,  this  model  is 
estimated  by  a  discrete  duration  method.  The  MWP  for  amenities  can  be  inferred  through  the 
estimated elasticities of the leave length with respect to the amenities and the wage. The results provide 
evidence that mothers are willing to sacrifice a significant fraction of their wage to reduce hazards 
(20%) and to enjoy a flexible working schedule (44-56%). 
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1. Introduction 
Almost  40%  of  mothers  in  the  OECD  are  currently  not  participating  in  the  labor 
force.
1 Among women with small children (younger than 3 years old) this percentage is even 
higher; at this time, 47% of them are inacti ve. Conversely, labor force participation among 
childless women is similar to that of men (73% versus 75%, respectively). Given that career 
interruptions lead to human capital depreciation and hence, to a loss in long-term income and 
career opportunities, it is crucial to understand the incentives that mothers face when deciding 
whether and when to return to work after childbirth.  So far, however, we lack any direct 
measure of the extent to which mothers ' work decision is triggered by certain job features.
2 
Therefore, this study provides a first estimate for mothers' marginal willingness to pay (MWP 
hereafter) for certain job-related amenities.  
Estimating the MWP for amenities is a complex endeavor and earlier research has failed 
to provide conclusive evidence.
3 Gronberg and Reed (1994), for instance, focus on the job 
search of employed male workers.  However, because of the unobservability of potential job 
offers, the authors are limited to estimating the impact of current job features on job tenure 
and fall short of separating these effects from those of the wage and amenities of latent job 
offers. Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) address this limitation by explicitly modeling 
the  wage/amenity  offer  process.  They  show  that  despite  weak  compensating  wage 
differentials, there is a systematic and significant MWP for job-related amenities. 
The  present  study  suggests  an  alternative  framework  for  the  estimation  of  mothers' 
MWP for amenities. Its identification strategy relies on German statutory maternity leave and 
                                                            
1 All numbers on mothers’ labor force participation are taken from www.oecd.org/els/social/family/database. 
2 There is some evidence that unfavorable working conditions (such as hazards, inflexible schedules, etc.) might 
be important deterrents to returning to work (Bratti et al., 2004; De Leire and Levy, 2004; Felfe, 2008).  
3 Note, there is a long literature on compensating wage differentials dating back to Rosen (1976). Since then  
empirical research has tried to estimate the compensation paid for disamenities  using so-called hedonic wage 
regressions (among others Lucas, 1977; Brown, 1981; Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Nevertheless, Hwang et al. 
(1998), prove theoretically that estimates from hedonic wage regressions are biased as they fail  to consider the 
dynamic nature of the labor market. Gronberg and Reed (1994)  are the first to address this issue. Notice, they 
estimate the price that  workers' are  willing to pay for amenities and  no t the compensating differentials 
determined by the market. The present study draws heavily upon their suggested strategy. 3 
thus on the time mothers decide to spend out of the labor force. The key proposition is that 
maternity leave will be shorter if a mother’s job, which is guaranteed while being on leave, 
offers more attractive characteristics such as higher wages and more amenities. Given this 
proposition, the MWP can be derived by dividing the elasticity of maternity leave length with 
respect to a certain amenity by the elasticity with respect to the wage. 
For  the  purpose  of  identification,  the  advantage  of  using  Germany  is  its  generous 
parental leave system; since 1992, German working mothers are entitled to a leave of 36 
months.
4
 During this period, mothers enjoy a job guarantee and, hence, are free to decide 
whether and when to return to their jobs. The remarkable length of this period allows for 
sufficient variation in the chosen duration of maternal leave. More importantly, the fact that 
jobs are guaranteed for the whole period enables observation of all the relevant features of the 
options mothers face while on leave: staying at home or returning to their guaranteed job 
during their legally granted leave period of 36 months. One may argue that since mothers may 
search for a new job while being on leave, I may likewise fail to observe possible external job 
offers. The data shows, however, that mothers rarely change jobs during maternal leave (only 
2%). The job  guarantee during the maternal  leave period is  thus  the  key  element  in  this 
strategy to estimate the MWP. 
My results, obtained from a discrete duration model using data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel and the Qualification and Career Survey, reveal that mothers are willing to 
sacrifice a significant fraction of their wage to reduce hazardous working conditions (almost 
20% for a reduction of one standard deviation) and to enjoy a working schedule compatible 
with  available  daycare  (44-55%).  Stratification  according  to  mothers'  and  their  partners’ 
education, total household income and geographical location reveal the following pattern: 
mothers with high intellectual and financial endowments show a more pronounced disposition 
                                                            
4 Germany, Austria, Finland and France provide the most generous parental leave systems in the OECD. The US, 
in contrast, entitles recent mothers only to a leave of 12 weeks. For a comparison see: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/indwm 4 
to  trade  wages  for  better  working  conditions;  mothers  in  West  Germany,  where  public 
childcare  is  particularly  rare,  are  willing  to  accept  higher  trade-offs  between  wages  and 
flexible working schedules.
5 
This study contributes to the literature  as follows. First, it provides unprecedented 
insight into the price mothers are willing to pay to enjoy certain amenities.  Moreover, given 
the proposed framework of maternity leave, we can overcome the limitations of previous 
studies to observe all relevant alternatives faced by the worker, and hence can provide a n 
accurate  measure  of  mothers'  MWP  for  amenities.  Given  one  major  challeng e  many 
industrialized countries are currently facing, namely the decline of the workforce relative to 
the  total  population,  understanding  mothers'  preferences  with  respect  to  certain  job 
characteristics is crucial as it may allow us to activate some unused work potential.  
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
introduction to German leave legislation. The theoretical and empirical model is developed in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 reports the  estimation results and Section 6 
concludes with  suggestions  for  an  efficient  policy  design  aimed  at  improving  mothers' 
situation in the labor market. 
 
2. Parental Leave Legislation 
  Germany is one of the OECD countries with the most generous parental leave system. 
It consists of three parts: maternity protection, protected parental leave and parental benefits. 
   The first, maternity protection, regulated by the maternity protection law (1979), refers 
to a period of six weeks before and eight weeks after birth during which mothers must not 
work.
6 The second, protected parental leave, allows the mother to choose between staying on 
                                                            
5 Notice, private childcare facilities are not common in Germany. Due to high regulation and a lack of public 
subsidies, it is not profitable to run a private childcare institution. 
6 During this period, the mother receives her net wage rate. The social security pays 13€ per day, while the 
employer has to cover the remaining amount.  5 
leave and returning to work during a certain period after giving birth.
7 Since the parental leave 
is the true period during which a mother is free to decide about her participation in the labor 
market, the present study focuses on this period. 
  The Federal Law of Parental Leave and Parental Benefit was introduced in 1986. It 
allows a woman to take some extra months off beyond the maternity protection period, while 
keeping  the  option  to  return  to  her  former  job;  i.e.  the  employer  has  to  guarantee  her  a 
position comparable to her former one. The parental leave has been subsequently extended 
from a length of 10 months at the time of its introduction in 1986 to a length of 36 months 
since 1992. A mother is eligible for parental leave if she has worked at least six months in the 
same job before childbirth. It is important to stress that the mother has to inform her employer 
as well as the social security in advance about her leave plans, in particular six weeks prior to 
childbirth. In other words, the decision about leave length has to be taken prior to childbirth 
and hence is based entirely on pre-leave criteria. 
This law also regulates the maternity benefits, the third pillar of the maternity leave 
legislation. The government pays the benefit conditional on the mother taking care of her 
child; in other words, it is paid as long as the mother remains on leave.
8 Until 1992 this 
benefit was provided for the whole leave period, but since 1992 for at most 24 months of the 
total parental leave period. While before 1994 the parental benefit was independent from 
household  income,  afterwards  it  became  i ncome  dependent.
9  There  are  two  income 
thresholds, one affects the payment of the b enefit in months 1-6 and the other applies to 
months 7-24.
10 An income higher than the respective threshold incurs a complete loss  of the 
benefit during the first six months, but only a gradual reduction of the benefit after month six. 
                                                            
7 Even if both parents are eligible for parental leave, in practice less than 5% of the fathers are taking leave. 
8 A mother is allowed to work at most 19h/week (from 2001 on: 30h/week) to receive the benefit. 
9 The amount of the benefits is calculated taking into account the household income in the year previous to 
childbirth and hence is based on pre-birth conditions. Note, it is not linked to previous maternal wages, but only 
depends on the remaining household income, such as husband's labor earnings, income from capital assets, etc.  
10 The total income during the first six months (months 7 -24) after birth cannot exceed 51000€ (20500€) for a 
two parent household and 38000€ (16500€) for a single parent household. 6 
Since 2001 a mother has the choice between two different benefit versions; either she receives 
a benefit of up to 300€ for 24 months or a higher benefit of up to 450€ for only 12 months.
  Previous  studies  have  shown  that  the  leave  legislation,  especially  the  total  leave 
length, affects mothers’ work decisions.
11 Therefore, in the following analysis I consider only 
the years from 1992 until 2006, during which the parental leave has gone unchanged.  
The  subsequent  section  introduces  the  random  utility  model  which  underlies  the 
estimation of mothers' leave length decision. 
  
3. A Model of Parental Leave Length 
3.1. The Basic Model 
  The following model captures the relevant considerations of a mother when deciding 
about the length of parental leave. This decision is implicitly assumed to be the result of 
rational decision-making, in the sense that choice is influenced by the expected costs and 
benefits of the available alternatives. The objective is to reveal the impact of the wage and 
amenities of the guaranteed job on the chosen leave duration. As pointed out above, it is 
crucial to be aware of the fact that the decision about the leave length has to be taken prior to 
childbirth and hence, is entirely based on the information available prior to childbirth.
12 
At any month during maternity leave a mothers has the choice between staying  on 
leave  or returning to work.  In case she stays on leave, she derives   utility from  her own 
consumption and from being on leave directly; in case she  returns to work, she derives as 
before utility from her own consumption,  but  as well  from  the amenities implied by her 
guaranteed job. A mother expects to face a budget constraint that, in addition to other sources 
                                                            
11 see Ondrich, Spiess, Yang and Wagner (2003); Schönberg and Ludsteck (2006). 
12 I want to emphasize again that not only the decision about maternity leave length has to be taken prior to 
childbirth, which is due to the obligation of a mother to inform both her employer as well as social security about 
her intended leave length prior to childbirth, but also the benefit is calculated considering the financial situation 
of the family in the year prior to childbirth. Despite the legal enforcement, there might be mothers who negotiate 
with their employer and hence deviate from the declared leave length. Unfortunately, we do not possess of any 
information about the leave declaration nor about possible agreements between mothers and employers and 
hence cannot take these cases into consideration.  7 
of income such as her husband’s income, capital income and so forth, is determined by her 
own wage, if she returns to work, and by the maternity benefit, if she is on leave. Thus, the 
alternative utilities of a mother i for every single month t of the leave period, before making 
any assumptions about functional forms, look as follows: 
 
    Uit
Leave
 = U (Cit; t; Xi; ʱi
L; εit)   if the mother is on leave 
Uit =                            (1) 
    Ui
Return to work  = U (Ci0; Ai0; Xi; ʱi
W)  if the mother returns to work 
 
 
      Cit = Ii0 + B(Ii0; t; yr)         if the mother is on leave 
s.t. Cit =              (2)
13
 
      Ci0 = Ii0 + Wi0           if the mother returns to work 
   
Let me first discuss the determinants of a mother's utility if she is on leave. First, a 
mother derives utility from her own consumption, indicated by Cit. In case she is on leave, her 
level of consumption is determined by the maternal benefit  B(Ii0;yr;t) as well as all other 
sources of household income Ii0. Notice, the available income sources are considered at period 
0, as the decision about maternity leave length has to be taken before childbirth and hence 
only information prior to childbirth is taken into account. The benefit, as explained in Section 
2, is a function of other sources of income assessed prior to childbirth (Ii0), the year in which 
the baby is born (yr), and the number of months woman i has already been on leave (t). 
Second,  as  mentioned  above  a  mother  also  obtains  utility  from  being  on  leave  directly, 
modeled by the direct dependence of the utility on the months a mother has been already on 
leave. Moreover, I assume the utility from being on leave to change over time, in particular to 
decrease over time. The underlying idea is that a mother’s time spent at home might be worth 
less over time, e.g. due to home productivity decreasing with the age of the child. Third, a 
mother's personal and professional characteristics, denoted by Xi, influence her utility. Last, I 
                                                            
13 Note that I assume no savings. Furthermore, I abstain from costs of a daycare place, as there is almost no 
daycare (for children under the age of 3) available in Germany. 8 
incorporate individual heterogeneity with respect to the utility derived from having a baby in 
general, denoted by ʱi
L
, and in the different months after giving birth, indicated by εit
L.  
If a mother returns to work, her utility is determined by her level of consumption Ci0, 
her personal and professional characteristics Xi, but also by the amenities Ai0 implied by her 
guaranteed  job.  The  index  0  of  the  amenities  refers  to  the  period  previous  to  birth  and 
indicates that due to the job guarantee a mother faces after maternity leave the same amenities 
as before. Likewise, she will receive the same wage Wi0 as before maternity leave. Hence, the 
level  of  consumption  she  experiences  when  returning  to  work,  which  in  this  case  is 
determined by her wage Wi0 and all other sources of income Ii0, is predetermined and the 
same at any of the 36 months of maternity leave. Finally, I consider individual heterogeneity 
with respect to the utility a woman derives from returning to work, which is assumed to be 
constant over time.
14 
Taken together, the above stated problem describes the following utility maximization 
problem: conditional on being eligible for maternity leave and given her budget constraint, a 
mother decides on the duration of her leave in order to maximize  the discounted sum of 
utilities over the 36 month period.
15 Due to the job guarantee, the utility from returning to 
work is constant over the total leave period; i.e. since a mother has the right to return to her 
former job with the same wage and the same amenities during 36 months, she will face the 
same utility irrespective of the timing of her return.
16 The utility gained from remaining on 
                                                            
14 Given the job guarantee, a mother has the right to work after maternity leave in the same job as before, hence 
she faces the same observable conditions. Additionally, I assume that at the moment of deciding about her leave 
length she expects to have the same perceived utility from returning to work at any of the 36 months of the leave 
period, thus there is no time varying error component. Nevertheless, in Section 5.2. we allow the MWP to vary 
over time which shall account for the fact that despite the job guarantee conditions at the work place might vary 
over time and a mother might take this possibility into consideration when deciding about leave length. 
15 The discount factor is for simplicity reasons assumed to be equal to one. Notice furthermore, after  the 36
th 
month, the job guarantee no longer exists, so a mother would have to start searching for a new job if she would 
like to participate in the labor market again. Therefore, the model considers only the 36 months of the total leave 
period during which a mother enjoys a job guarantee. 
16 Obviously, over a 36 month period of not working, a woman is likely to experience a depreciation in human 
capital and may miss promotion opportunities. Thus, women in fields with high human capital depreciation 
and/or promotion opportunities will tend to return to wo rk faster. In order to capture the severity of those 
foregone opportunities, I additionally control for the average wage growth of mothers' occupational category. 
See Section 3.2 for more details.  9 
leave, on the contrary, is dependent on time and in particular decreasing over time. This is due 
to the declining benefit payment and the decreasing utility of staying at home over time. Thus, 
once the utility of being on leave is lower than that of returning to work at a given month t, it 
remains lower for the rest of the leave period.  
The decision to return to work is thus a once-and-for-all decision; i.e., as soon as the 
utility of returning to work is greater than the utility of being on leave, a mother returns to 
work and stays until the end of the total leave period. The probability that a mother i starts 
working in month t, is thus as follows:  
 
  Prob (Return to workit =1)  




              = Prob (U(Ii0+Wi0; Ai0; Xi; ʱi
W) > U(Ii0+B(Ii0;t;yr); t; Xi; ʱi
L; εit))            (3) 
 
This expression allows for predictions regarding the effect of the variables of interest: 
the higher the wage a mother is sacrificing while not working, the higher the opportunity costs 
of being on leave and thus the shorter the leave.
17 Assuming that amenities enter  the utility 
function positively, a mother rather returns to work early when she enjoys certain amenities.  
  Our final objective is to estimate mothers’ MWP for certain amenities. Following the 
approach by Gronberg and Reed (1994), we can use the elasticities of the probabilities to 
return to work with respect to the wage and to a certain amenity to derive the MWP: 
 
   
)
)
Pr (Return to work






WA MWP ob A
W
            (4) 
 
                                                            
17 Besides the substitution effect of mother's wage on the elasticity of the leave duration, which is considered by 
the model, there may be furthermore an income effect. If maternity leave is a normal good, then higher wage 
mothers will experience a positive income effect and hence stay longer at home. While this income effect is 
unlikely to swamp the substitution effect, it will lead to smaller wage estimates. As we can see in equation (4), 
the wage coefficient enters the calculation of the MWP in the denominator, and thus, the here provided MWP 
may provide only a lower bound. 10 
  From here it is straightforward, using the derivatives of the probability to return to 




                   (5) 
  We can see that the MWP is determined by the marginal utility of consumption UC 
and the marginal utility of the amenity UA. The MWP is inversely related to the marginal 
utility  of  consumption;  i.e.,  the  higher  the  marginal  increase  in  utility  due  to  more 
consumption, the less wage a mother is willing to sacrifice for an amenity. The opposite is 
true for amenities; i.e., the higher the marginal utility of an amenity, the more wage a mother 
would give up in order to enjoy this amenity.  
  This  model  is  of  course  simplistic  and  ignores  the  possibility  that  mothers  might 
search for a new job while being on leave. However, as the data demonstrate, this assumption 
is far from being unrealistic; mothers see their job guarantee as a kind of insurance and thus 
rarely  change  jobs  during  their  maternity  leave  (only  2%).  This  assumption  of  no  job 
searching is the key stone of the model, which thus offers a framework that allows for an 
economic interpretation of the parameters and for an accurate derivation of mothers’ MWP. 
3.2. Implementation 
  In  order  to  estimate  the  model,  we  need  to  make  some  assumptions  about  the 
functional form of the utility and the distribution of the residuals. For simplicity, I assume a 
linear individual utility function, so that equation (1) combined with equation (2) becomes:            
                                                  





L +εit     if the mother is on leave 
     Uit =                             (6) 
     Ui 
Return to work  = β
W(Ii0+Wi0)+δAi0+η
WXi+ʱi
W             if the mother returns to work 
 
   
where,  as  before,  the  utility  derived  from  being  on  leave  is  determined  by 
consumption, in this case constituted by the benefit B(Ii0;t;yr) and other income sources Ii0, by 
the time spent at home directly, by personal and professional characteristics Xi and by a time 11 
invariant and a time varying error component, denoted by ʱi
L and εit respectively. The utility 
derived from returning to work is likewise determined by consumption, now determined by 
mother's guaranteed wage Wi0 and other income sources Ii0, as well as her individual observed 
and unobserved characteristics, Xi and ʱi
W  respectively. Additionally, her utility depends on 
the amenities she faces when returning to her guaranteed job, denoted by Ai0. In the following 
I describe briefly how the different determinants are included in the estimation procedure. 
As already mentioned consumption is determined by the total income of a household 
which consists of the mother’s wage Wi0, in case she is back to work, the maternal benefit, in 
case she is on leave, and other sources of income Ii0. In order to capture the determinants of 
the maternal benefit B(Ii0;t;yr), I include additionally a set of year and month dummies. Both 
consumption coefficients β
L and β
W are expected to be positive since a higher disposable 
income is assumed to increase utility. The effect of being on leave on utility is assumed to be 
not only direct but also to change over time, which is captured by a decomposition of the 
leave coefficient: one general coefficient, γ0, and another one, γ1, which interacts with the 
leave length t. In this way, I allow the utility of being on leave to decrease over time. This 
effect is controlled for by a set of month dummies. As personal characteristics I  consider 
mother's  age,  partnership,  education,  region  and  the  number  of  children;  professional 
properties  are  proxied  by  the  sector  in  which  the  woman  works  as  well  as  the  average 
occupational wage growth. The two latter variables are assumed to capture opportunity costs 
of not working, such as missed promotion opportunities or depreciation in human capital. 
Allowing the coefficient η to depend on mother's working status reflects the possibility that 
professional and personal features might influence the utility differently, depending on if a 
mother is on leave or returns to work. The main interest lies in the impact of amenities on 
utility which a mother is exposed to as soon as she returns to her guaranteed job. Thus, a great 
variety  of  amenities  Ai0  is  included  in  the  regression  (see  Section  4.2  for  details).  The 12 
coefficient  δ  is  expected  to  be  positive,  indicating  an  increasing  effect  of  an  amenity  on 
utility.  
Under the linear specification of the utility function outlined in equation (6) and the 
additional assumption that εit follows a logistic distribution, the probability of returning work 
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L), respectively. The 
decision about the leave length can be estimated by a discrete logistic duration model; the 
likelihood function includes all months a mother stays on leave, modeled by (1-Prob(Return 
to workit)), and the month when she returns to work, expressed by Prob(Return to workit). The 
estimation of the coefficients is, however, complicated by the fact that mothers might differ 
systematically in their unobserved characteristics, represented by ʱi, even though they are 
observationally identically. Since the  composition of the sample of mothers who stay on 
leave changes as time proceeds, with respect to both, observed and unobserved characteristics, 
ignoring this unobserved heterogeneity can lead to inconsistent estimators. Hence, I estimate 
the  leave  decision  using  a  discrete  logistic  duration  model  and  allow  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity introducing a log-normally distributed time-invariant individual component ʱi.
19  
                                                            
18 The results are robust to different assumptions about the error distributions and are available upon request. 
19  I estimate the model assuming different functional forms for the unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. gamma 
distribution, discrete mass points). The results however do not alter significantly and are available upon request. 
One  alternative  estimation  method  wou ld  be  to  take  advantage  of  multiple  spell  data  which  allows  the 
elimination of individual permanent unobserved characteristics. There are however two concerns  which speak 
against the use of multiple spell data in this context. first, as mentioned, multiple spell data only allows us to get 
hold of individual permanent differences, time varying differences are, however, not controlled for. Second, in 13 












          (8) 
  Given the positive coefficient  of the wage and  of the amenities,  the MWP for an 
amenity should be positive. Thus, the model predicts that a mother is willing to sacrifice part 
of her wage to enjoy certain amenities.  
Notice, the suggested estimation method only corrects for time invariant heterogeneity 
among mothers' which is independent of their individual observable characteristics. Issues 
like mothers' sorting into occupations according to their personal preferences might not be 
tackled with this random-effect type model.
20 So far, please bear in mind, that the estimated 
coefficients have to be interpreted as the causal effect of the characteristics of the guaranteed 
job on leave length plus the preference of a mother for a certain type of job. 
The next section describes the datasets used and the construction of the amenities. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. The German Socio-Economic Panel and the Qualification and Career Survey 
  For the analysis of mothers’ MWP for job-related amenities, two datasets are used: the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the Qualification and Career Survey (QCS). 
The GSOEP is an annually repeated survey of Germans and foreigners in East and West 
Germany, which has followed its members continuously since 1984.
21 This study uses waves 
1992-2006 which correspond to the period during which the maternity leave period has 
remained unchanged. The QCS is a survey of employees carried out by the German Federal  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the context of maternity leave spells, women who are observed several times taking maternity leave are by 
definition multiple mothers, which are first rare and second a special type of mothers whose preferences cannot 
be generalized. 
20 This issue of occupational sorting will be discussed more in Section 5.3. 
21 For more information about the GSOEP please refer to Wagner, G. et al (2007). 
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Institute  for  Vocational  Training  (Bundesinstitut  für  Berufsbildung)  and  the  Institute  for 
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung). There are four cross-
sections  launched  in  1979,  1985/86,  1991/92,  and  1998/99,  each  covering  about  30,000 
individuals. For this study, the latest cross-section is used since it lies within the time at which 
the sample of mothers takes parental leave and is the only cross-section that includes a 4-digit 
occupational code that allows a merging of the two datasets.
22 
  The GSOEP and the QCS have several features that make them especially suitable for 
the proposed methodology to estimate mothers’ MWP for amenities. The GSOEP has detailed 
annual information on personal as well as on some professional characteristics such as the 
individual’s  occupation,  the  wage  and  the  working  schedule.  Furthermore,  it  provides 
monthly information on fertility as well as professional activities, such as working and being 
on maternity leave. This information allows me to construct maternity leave spells for each 
woman and to determine her occupation prior to childbirth. The QCS contains a great variety 
of occupational amenities, which complements the occupational information provided by the 
GSOEP. Details about the amenities contained in the QCS are given below. 
  The sample of interest includes all women who gave birth during 1992-2005 and were 
eligible for maternity leave.
23 As described in Section 2 , eligibility for maternity leave  is 
conditional on having worked for at least  six months on the same job. According to the 
Federal Statistical Office, in 2003, 90% of West German women qualified for maternity 
leave, while not even 65% of East German mothers did so. In spite of being less eligible for 
maternity leave, East German women more often exercise their right to maternity leave: 95% 
of eligible women in East Germany take some leave, while in West Germany only 80% do so.  
  The data provided by the GSOEP suffer from two shortcomings: first, the monthly 
activity history is partly left censored, which complicates the derivation of mothers’ eligibility 
                                                            
22 Alternatively I use the 3-digit occupational code, which is available for waves 1991/92 and 1998/99. The 
results using this alternative code barely differ and are available upon request. 
23 An important part of the information is reported retrospectively; thus, not all necessary information can be 
recovered for the last available wave 2006. 15 
for maternity leave. Relaxing the eligibility condition and treating every woman as eligible 
who is observed in an employment contract for at least one month before giving birth, 85% of 
West and 65% of East German women in the sample qualified for maternity leave in 2003.  
  The  second  problem  in  the  data  is  that  activities  are  often  simultaneously  and 
sometimes incorrectly reported. If declaring several parallel activities I give preference to 
being on leave. According to the maternity protection law, women are not allowed to work in 
the  first  eight  weeks  after  giving  birth.  However,  more  than  5%  of  the  women  reported 
working during the maternity protection period. Since these spells are certainly mis-reported, 
I exclude all leave spells that are shorter than two months.  
  The final sample includes 1404 leave spells (28,587 individual-month observations).
 24 
607 women returned to their job, out of which 31 continued working immediately after the 
protection period. 208 women were on leave for the whole parental leave period and did not 
exercise their right to return to work during the first three years after birth. The remaining 589 
spells are right censored, thus we do not know whether and when they returned to work. That 
said, we observe high panel attrition, an issue which is further discussed in Section 5.3.  
4.2. Amenities 
  As  mentioned  above,  the  GSOEP  contains  information  on  individual  wages  and 
personal working schedules, in particular working hours (including overtime), frequency of 
working in the evening (6-9pm), during the night (9pm-6am) and in rotating shifts. The QCS 
provides information on additional, more specific job features that are not provided by the 
GSOEP:
25  physical demand of the job, lifting  heavy weights (>20 kg), lying down or 
                                                            
24 These spells include leave spells following the first until the fifth birth. In case a woman reported being on 
leave several times, I treat this as a separate spell, while controlling for the order of birth. In Section 5.3., I 
estimate a competing risk model of only first birth spells. 
25 The GSOEP contains some information about broadly defined amenity categories.  Hence, one alternative to 
average occupational conditions is to rely on these individually reported conditions, which have the advantage to 
vary on the individual level and to correspond exactly to the conditions perceived by the mother.  For my 
objective, however, these categories are to general and furthermore  to noisy. Average occupational conditions 
have the advantage to be an objective measure for the work conditions. Given that our matching procedure relies 
on the 4-digit occupational code, which comprises more than 800 occupations, they should represent the 
individual situation of the mother quite well. 16 
kneeling, standing during most of the shift, if the job is tiring for the eyes, if the job exposes 
the worker to dust or smoke, to a dirty working environment, to extreme climate conditions, 
to noise and to risks of injury. These amenities, actually in this case rather disamenities, can 
be matched with the sample of women on maternity leave via the 4-digit occupational code of 
the Federal Statistical Institute, which is contained in both datasets. Thus, the final sample 
contains information about the occupation in which a woman worked prior to giving birth, the 
individual  wage,  the  personal  working  schedule,  and  the  average  occupational  aspects  of 
workload and hazards.  
  In  order  to  create  representative  average  occupational  characteristics,  I  restrict  the 
1998/99 wave of the QCS to women in their child-bearing ages (16-46 years), like the ones in 
the sample of interest.  These women  are engaged in  772 different  occupations.  For  each 
occupation I calculate the mean of every amenity. In the original QCS questionnaire, the 
women  are  asked  if  they  are  never,  rarely,  sometimes,  often  or  always  exposed  to  the 
respective condition, which is coded into discrete values of 0 to 4. However, averaging these 
discrete values for different occupations produces values that are close to being continuous on 
a  scale  from  0  to  4.  For  interpretational  convenience,  I  rescale  the  average  occupational 
characteristics from 0 to 100: the occupation with the highest level of a certain condition takes 
the value 100 and the lowest level takes 0.
26  
   The above described occupational characteristics are very detailed and specific. For 
the purpose of significance and plausible interpretation, I create two indices (unweighted 
averages), summarized as “workload” and “hazards”, according to the distinction made in the 
literature on compensating wage differentials.
27 The following characteristics are included in 
                                                            
26 For every amenity we observe both the highest (100) and the lowest (0). An example might illustrate this 
ranking: workers in the plastic industry are the ones most exposed to risks of injury and death (they all report the 
value 4); while secretaries are least threatened by these dangers (they all report the value 0). Thus, the plastic 
industry gets the average value of 100 for risks of injury, while secretaries get 0. All other occupations are 
ranked in between.   
27For the construction of the unweighted averages I follow Rosen (1986) or Villanueva (2007). Alternatively, I 
employ factor analysis. Estimation results using the resulting factor s barely differ from our results and are 
available upon  request. 17 
each  of  the  two  indices:  “workload”  contains  having  a  physically  demanding  job,  lifting 
heavy weights (>20 kg), lying down or kneeling, standing all the time and having a job that is 
tiring for the eyes; while “hazards” incorporate being exposed to dust or smoke, dirt or oil, 
extreme climate conditions, noise and risks of injury. The respective amenities within the two 
groups are sufficiently correlated among each other and hence represent reliable measures for 
the aspects of workload and hazards.
28 
  To  summarize,  the  sample  contains  women  eligible  for  maternity  leave,  their 
individual wages, their personal working schedule (both taken from the GSOEP) and indices 
for average occupational workload and hazards (both constructed using the QCS). In the 
subsequent section, I present some descriptive statistics of the sample, the est imation results 
and several robustness checks. 
 
5. Estimation Results  
5.1. Variables and Summary Statistics 
  The first step of the analysis of mothers' MWP for amenities is to estimate the model 
of mothers’ decision about maternity leave length. The determinants of interest are wages Wi0 
and amenities Ai0. These characteristics belong to the job a mother holds before going on 
maternity leave and to which she can return given the job guarantee during the whole leave 
period. An overview can be found in Table 1. For illustrative purposes, Table 2a provides a 
list of the top ten jobs, ranked in a descending order according to their level of hazards and 
workload. Additionally, Table 2b introduces the most common occupations among recent 
mothers and displays the respective mean of the different job characteristics.  
  The pecuniary aspect of the job is included in the estimation as the natural logarithm 
of the real gross wage rate. The average monthly gross income is 1600€ (the natural logarithm 
of  the  real  gross  wage  is  2.3).  The  non-pecuniary  characteristics  are  grouped  into  the 
                                                            
28 The Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73 for workload and 0.81 for hazards.  18 
following three aspects: the working schedule, workload and hazards. With respect to the 
working  schedule  we  observe  the  following:  Women  work  on  average  35  hours,  which 
includes on average 2 hours overtime. Quite a few mothers work in the evening (21%), at 
night (9%) and in rotating shifts (14%). With respect to average occupational workload and 
hazards the ranking shown in Table 2a tells us the following: The industry that demands the 
highest workload and the highest level of hazards is the plastic industry. Mothers, however, 
work mostly in occupations that expose them to slightly better conditions ( Table 2b). The 
most common occupation among mothers, nursing, exposes their workers to only 10.6% of 
the hazards and 64.0% of the workload involved in the plastic industry. Notice, while the 
level of hazards nurses are exposed to, corresponds to the average level of hazards (10.6) 
involved  in  mothers'  occupations,  the  physical  effort  nurses  have  to  exert  lies  above  the 
average level (39.9). Further popular jobs among young mothers, such as banking and retail, 
offer even better conditions: the level of workload is 29.1 and 48.9, and of hazards 2.7 and 
7.0, respectively. 
  The maternity leave decision is also influenced by institutions, such as the maternity 
benefit or the child care facilities. The benefit is proxied by the total household income Ii0 and 
a set of year (1992-2005) and month dummies (36). The month dummies account furthermore 
for the fact that the utility of being on leave may decline with the age of the child. With the 
exception of East Germany, publicly available childcare for children under the age of 3 is 
very precarious in Germany; only 3% are actually covered by formal childcare. Hence, I 
control for this difference by including a dummy for East and West Germany. 
  As explained in Section 3, individual characteristics may play an important role for the 
leave decision. Table 3 gives an overview of the personal and household characteristics of the 
women  in  the  sample.  I  control  for  age,  partnership,  education,  income,  the  number  of 
previous children, and last the sector in which the woman has been working.  19 
  Before describing the regression results, notice the length of maternity leave and its 
relation with each amenity. The Kaplan-Meier Survival estimates display a smooth pattern of 
maternity leave lengths (see Table 4); mothers are observed to return to their guaranteed job 
equally at any months of the maternity leave period. A first look at the relationship between 
leave length and wage, and leave length and amenities, without controlling for any other 
variables, already provides some useful insights (see Table 5). As expected, a higher wage is 
associated with  a shorter maternity leave, while more hazards or workload with  a longer 
leave. This is, however, only a first impression gained from the raw data. In the next section I 
present the results of the multivariate regression analysis which allow for more interpretation. 
5.2. Results 
As introduced in Section 3.2., I estimate the leave decision using a discrete duration 
model with a logistic hazard function and log-normally distributed random effects. Table 6 
displays the resulting coefficients of the individual wage, the different aspects of the personal 
working schedule and the average occupational indices workload and hazards.
29  
  Models 1 to 3 compare the estimation results, controlling first for no other variables 
except mothers' job characteristics, then including additionally personal characteristics (age, 
education,  partner,  region,  total  household  income  and  birth  order),  and  last  average 
occupational wage growth as well as  sector, month and year dummies. I also repeat the 
estimation  under  different  assumptions  for  the  functional  form  of  the  baseline  hazard: 
including, instead of month dummies, either the logarithm or a polynom ial of the time being 
on  leave  (model  4  and  5  respectively).  The  results  barely  change  with  the  different 
specifications. Thus, the following discussion of the results focuses on the specification 
assumed in model 3, including the full set of control varia bles and using a non-parametric 
baseline hazard (month dummies). 
                                                            
29 The full set of estimated coefficients is available upon request. 20 
  The theory predicts that the higher the wage, and hence, the higher the opportunity 
costs  of  not  working,  the  more  likely  a  mother  is  to  return  to  her  job.  The  estimated 
coefficient of the ln of real gross wage confirms the prediction: women who have a job that 
pays 10% more wage per hour are 0.1% more likely to return to work in a given month (at the 
1% significance level). The model, as introduced in Section 3, suggests furthermore a positive 
effect of amenities on the decision to return to work. The estimated coefficient of the hazards 
is in line with this prediction: women who have been working under bad working conditions 
tend to stay significantly (at the 5% level) longer on maternity leave: one standard deviation 
more of hazards (which corresponds to 10 units of hazards and, for example, to the difference 
in hazards a secretary or a nurse are exposed to) reduces the likelihood to return to work by 
0.2%. Estimating the model using as controls each of the different aspects included in the 
index “hazards” separately shows that the deterring effect stems mainly from jobs exposing 
the women to dust, smoke and extreme climate conditions.
30 The actual effect of workload is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, looking at the separate effects of the different aspects of workload 
reveals  that  working in an uncomfortable position such as  stooping, kneeling,  etc., has  a 
significantly  negative  effect  on  returning  to  work.  The  working  schedule  influences  the 
decision of leave length as follows: mothers in jobs entailing on average ten hours more per 
week, are 0.1% less likely to work in a given month. Jobs requiring night work are also less 
attractive to mothers after childbirth (by 0.3%). However, both effects are not significant. In 
addition, women who have jobs that involve working in the evening or in rotating shifts are 
significantly (at the 5% level) more likely to work in a given month (by 0.6% and 0.7% 
respectively).   
The effect of personal characteristics on the leave length decision are in line with the 
findings of previous studies;
31 women who are older and have a partner, several children and 
more financial resources are less likely to work soon after childbirth, while women who live 
                                                            
30 The estimation results including all job characteristics separately are available upon request. 
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in  East  Germany  and  are  highly  educated  tend  to  return  to  work  earlier.  Moreover,  the 
estimated coefficients of the month dummies predict a decreasing utility from being on leave: 
while during the first twelve months mothers are 0.7-1.9% more likely to return to work then 
right  after  childbirth,  this  probability  increases  to  2.8-5.5%  during  the  second  year  after 
childbirth and to even 2.2-9.3% during the third year after childbirth. Testing for the presence 
of individual time-invariant heterogeneity, such as ability or preferences, reveals moreover a 
significant impact of these individual unobserved characteristics on the maternity leave length 
decision (the estimated coefficient of the random effect is significant at a 1% significance 
level). 
  Given the elasticities of the hazard rate with respect to wages and the selection of 
amenities, it is now straightforward to derive how much mothers are willing to pay for these 
amenities (see Table 7). In line with the estimated coefficients shown above, mothers are only 
willing to sacrifice a significant percentage of their wage for a decrease of hazards and to 
overcome a rigid working schedule. For a less hazardous work, mothers are willing to give up 
a significant (at the 5% level) amount: in order to suffer one standard deviation less health 
risks, recent mothers are willing to sacrifice 19.9% of their wage. Furthermore, it may be 
more convenient for mothers to work in the evening or in rotating shifts, as these schedules 
may allow for an informal solution of childcare. Consequently, we can see that mothers are 
willing to sacrifice 44.2% of their wage to work in the evening and 54.7% for rotating shifts. 
The estimates for mothers' MWP are surprisingly high. Thus, in order to provide some 
supports for my findings I pursue the follow approach. First, comparing my findings with the 
MWP  for  males  found,  for  instance,  by  Gronberg  and  Reed  (1994)  and  Bonhomme  and 
Jolivet (forthcoming) and providing further outside evidence on the prevalence of certain job-
related amenities among recent mothers allows me to put my findings in the context of the 
literature. Second, stratification according to individual or institutional characteristics sheds 
some  light  on  the  determinants  which  might  trigger  mothers'  MWP.  For  this  purpose,  I 22 
analyze  the  impact  of  wages  and  amenities  on  the  chosen  leave  duration,  distinguishing 
between mothers' regional, financial and educational background and last the leave length.  
Let me first discuss the basic regression results with respect to occupational hazards 
which reveal a high disposition of mothers to pay significant amounts to avoid occupational 
hazards (19.9% for a reduction by one standard deviation). This estimate lies slightly above 
previous findings for the MWP of male workers. Gronberg and Reed (1994), for instance, find 
a MWP of 13.4% for US male workers; Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) confirm this 
magnitude for Austrian, Danish and Dutch workers (12.8-15.2%).
32 The slightly higher MWP 
for good  working conditions among mothers is in line with findings of previous studies 
(DeLeire and Levy, 2004; Felfe, 2008) which attest a crowding of women, in particular of 
mothers,  into  safe  jobs.  Distinguishing  between  mothers  with  different  financial  and 
educational background, however, shows that not all women are willing or able to sacrifice 
significant parts of their wage to reduce unpleasant or unhealthy conditions. Table 8a provides 
the MWP to avoid hazards for mothers of different income and education gr oups. A clear 
pattern arises: the more financial resources, the more wage a mother is willing to give up to 
diminish these hazards (18%-25% for a reduction by one standard deviation); likewise the 
more education a woman has, the bigger the accepted trade-off between wage and hazardous 
conditions (0%-77%). Moreover, distinguishing between the education of a woman's partner 
confirms the trend associated with the intellectual background: the more educated a woman's 
partner, the more averse is a woman towards occupational hazards (-3%-60%).  
  The MWP for a non -standard working schedule among recent mothers might be 
unexpectedly high at first sight. Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming), for instance, find a 
much lower MWP for a convenient working schedule among Dut ch and Danish workers 
                                                            
32 Notice, Bonhomme and Jolivet (forthcoming) use a sample of 8 countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal). For the purpose of comparison between their findings and my findings,  
it is reasonable to use only those countries which are similar to Germany in cultural aspects. 23 
(15.2% and 22.0%, respectively).
33 Nevertheless, non-standard working schedules seem to be 
more widespread among parents. Presser (2005) elicits family reasons as the main predictor 
for  non-standard working  hours   and  puts  forward the persistently  higher prevalence  of 
unorthodox working schedules among workers with children. Hence, in case a non-standard 
working schedule helps parents to arrange childcare informally, we should be able to observe 
an increase in the compatibility of parents' working schedules around child birth.  In order to 
give some more substance to this supposition, I construct a measure indicating if the partners 
work according to complementary schedules and hence, if there is at least one person at home 
at  any  time  of  the  day.  Using  a  logit  regression  and  controlling  for  demographic 
characteristics of the couple, such as age, education, region and having a child, shows that the 
presence  of  a  child  leads  to  increased  complementarities  of  the  working  schedul es, 
particularly  in  West  Germany  (15%).
34  Moreover,  stratification  according  to  partner's 
education reveals additionally that coordination of childcare seems to work the better the 
higher the intellectual background: the more educated their partner, the higher mothers' MWP 
to work according to an unorthodox working schedule, 0%-83% for a working schedule in the 
evening and 12%-98% for rotating shifts.
35  
Taken together, these results  support the hypothesis that mothers appreciate a non -
standard working schedule as it allows them to coordinate the childcare informally with their 
partner. Nevertheless, stratification of the estimation between East and West German women 
might help to investigate  this hypothesis further. Remember, the coverage of  childcare 
facilities for children under the age of three is very poor in West Germany, as only 3% of the 
children  can  be  accommodated  in  formal  daycare.  In  East  Germany,  however,  public 
childcare is available for every third child. Hence, regressions that control for interactions 
between the variety of job features and a dummy for East Germany could help to shed some 
                                                            
33 Notice, however, French workers are willing to sacrifice 43.4% of their wage in order to work according to  
suitable working times. 
34 Results for this analysis are available upon request. 
35 Results for this analysis are available upon request. 24 
light on the outlined hypothesis. As can clearly be seen in Table 8b, only West German 
women have the disposition to sacrifice significant (at the 5% level) amounts of their wage in 
order to adjust the working schedule to their family life; they are willing to accept a wage 
reduction of 1.3% to work one hour less, 53.7% to work in the evenings and 54.3% to enjoy 
rotating shifts. East German women, if anything, would have to receive a premium in order to 
work in the evenings (55.89% of their hourly wage, which however is not significant). These 
sharp differences between East and West Germany support the hypothesis that mothers' high 
MWP for non-standard working schedules can be traced back to family obligations. 
Finally, the MWP for amenities might also vary with the time mothers stay out of the 
labor market. As mentioned above, this variation might not at last arise due to the fact that, 
despite the job guarantee, conditions at the workplace might change over time. However, 
comparing the amenities before and after the maternity leave of the women who actually 
return to work (see Table 9a), we can observe major changes only in working hours and the 
wage.
36 First, the drop in working hours per week can be explained by the high fraction of 
mothers coming back only to a part-time job. Since 2001, one has the right to reduce working 
hours as soon as the company has 15 employees or more. Including an interaction term 
between the reform and the size of the company as an additional control variable reveals that 
the right to work part -time has a positive, but not significant impact on the leave length 
decision. Second, as mentioned already above, over a period of 36 month a mother may miss 
promotion opportunities and is likely to experience a depreciation in human capital. Including 
occupational average wage growth as a control variable shall account for this possibility. Its 
coefficient is positive, indicating an earlier return to a job with more promotion possibilities, 
but insignificant. A mother might moreover integrate the wage depreciation into her decision 
about the leave length. Thus, the impact of the wage on the leave decision might vary over 
time and is not, as previously assumed, stable over the whole leave period. Using the results 
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from an estimation where additional interaction terms between the wage and dummies for all 
three years of the leave period are included reveals that the MWP to diminish hazards and to 
enjoy an unorthodox working schedule increases slightly, but not significantly over the years 
(see Table 9b). 
5.3. Additional Specifications and Robustness Checks 
As already discussed in Section 3.2., modeling mothers' leave decision is complicated 
by the fact that mothers might differ systematically in their behavior, even though they are 
observationally identically. In the baseline estimation, presented in Section 5.2., I approached 
this problem by modeling the time invariant heterogeneity among mothers as a log-normally 
distributed random effect. The key assumption of this correction method is no correlation 
between the unobserved characteristics and the control variables. Mothers, however, might 
differ in their career aspirations and in their preferences for job conditions. These differences 
might cause mothers to sort into occupations which differ in the amount of amenities offered. 
In other words, job-related amenities and mothers' unobserved characteristics might actually 
be correlated and thus, our estimated coefficients might be biased. Nevertheless, the direction 
of this bias is not obvious. One could argue that women who are career-oriented return to 
work earlier, have a high preference for wage but not a strong preference for amenities. In this 
case, our estimated amenity coefficients would be biased towards zero, the estimated wage 
coefficient would be upward biased and the derived MWP for amenities would consequently 
provide a lower bound. However it may also hold true that women who try to combine career 
and family, i.e., want to have a child but also intend to work as soon as possible, sort into jobs 
that offer them a high level of amenities and thus allow for the compatibility of work and 
family. Should this actually be the case, the amenity coefficients and the above derived MWP 
would be overestimated. 
  One exercise to investigate if this presorting may bias the coefficients is to estimate 
the  model  using  a  subsample  of  women  who  cannot  choose  their  job  according  to  their 26 
personal preferences. In the former German Democratic Republic, people could not freely 
choose  their  job,  but  were  assigned  an  occupation  after  finishing  their  education.
37 
Consequently, East German women who had a baby shortly after the reunification had the 
same right to maternity leave as West German women, but did not have the  opportunity to 
choose a job according to their family plans. Thus, restricting the sample to th e first three 
years  after  reunification,  1992 -94,  and  estimating  the  baseline  model  with  additional 
interaction terms for the wage and amenities and a dummy for East German women should 
help us to investigate if presorting causes a bias.
38  With respect to  the MWP  for better 
working conditions, no significant differences can be revealed for East German women soon 
after the German reunification. With respect to the working schedule, preferences of East 
German women right after the unification seem to resemble  the preferences of all East 
German women. Hence, these results give rise to think that presorting into family friendly 
jobs might not affect mothers’ MWP. Due to the small sample size, however, we might not 
conclude statistically significant results. 
  Besides differences in career aspirations, there also might be diversity among women 
with respect to their family plans. First, the decision to become a mother might be triggered 
by  the  individual  job  situation.  Due  to  an  unsatisfying  job  situation  women  might,  for 
instance, want to take a break from work and anticipate their family plans. In this case our 
sample  would  over-represent  women  in  worse  job  conditions  who  stay  longer  on  leave. 
Consequently, the estimated amenity coefficients would be upward biased. Previous studies 
(Lauer and Mühlenweg, 2003; Bratti, et al. 2004), however, do not find any selection into 
                                                            
37 In the former GDR occupational choice was severely restricted. Occupational sorting was highly controlled by 
a so-called "Process of the supply of the young workforce". In a first step, the school was coordinating the 
demand and the supply of labor, in other words it had to accommodate the needs of the economy with the 
available students. In a second step, the Office of Labor had to agree to each work contract carried out between a 
worker and a firm. Additionally, political orientation and social origin were strongly determining if someone 
could realize their personal occupational plans. In other words, the right of free occupational choice was severely 
restricted,  if  not  even  non  existing  in  the  former  GDR.  For  more  details  about  the  occupational    selection 
process, please refer to Zimmermann (2002).  
38 A further reduction of the sample is not possible due to a small s ample size. Due to high unemployment in 
East Germany, women, however, did not frequently change their job in the years  following reunification. The 
results of the estimation are available upon request. 27 
motherhood  due  to  job  features  when  estimating  the  decision  about  fertility  and  LFP 
simultaneously. Second, so far we neglected a further option women have besides staying at 
home or returning to work, namely getting another child. Yet, the main sample includes all 
leave spells, following first, second and further births. In case the birth of a further baby lies 
within the maternity leave period following the birth of a previous baby, this spell is treated as 
a censored spell. In order to take into account the possibility of consecutive childbirths, I use a 
restricted sample including only spells after first childbirth and analyze mothers' decision 
between  staying  on  leave,  returning  to  work  or  having  another  baby.  For  this  purpose,  I 
estimate a competing risk model that represents the choice of mothers between these three 
alternatives during the 36 months after the first childbirth.
39 First-time mothers demonstrate a 
similar MWP to reduce hazards (30% for a decrease of one standard deviation), and to be able 
to work during the evening (50%) or in rotating shifts (45%).  
  One last unobserved dimension, in which mothers might vary, is ability. First, one 
might think that employers are willing to offer more productive women both a higher wage 
and more amenities. Second, more capable women might also be more likely to return to work 
early. If ability is correlated with both better working conditions and a tend ency to work, the 
coefficients estimated in the main specification may be overestimated. Considering, however, 
the nature of disamenities, such as dust, dirt, extreme temperatures, noise and certain health 
risks, it is difficult for an employer to treat more productive women differently with respect to 
the level of these disamenities. Moreover, the wage, measured on the individual level, should 
be a function of education, experience, ability, and so forth, and thus should incorporate 
individual ability; i.e., the potential problem of endogeneity should be ruled out.
40 
                                                            
39 Estimation results of the competing risk model are available upon request. 
40 In the context of hedonic wage regressions, where the wage is the dependent variable, unobserved ability 
constitutes a more severe problem. Nevertheless, I pursue a further robustness check and  use "permanent" wages 
(an average of the wage during all years previous to childbirth) instead of the individual wage prior to childbirth, 
as those  are less prone to measurement errors. Second, I use average occupational wages which are less likely to 
be correlated with ability. The results barely alter and are available upon request. 28 
  Before concluding, I want to address the above mentioned issue of attrition. So far I 
implicitly assume that “missing” women (3% per month on average) behave as the women 
continuously observed in the dataset. This is a strong assumption, since we cannot be sure that 
attrition is a random event. One way to check the robustness of the main specification is to 
estimate the model using samples extended under extreme assumptions: the “missing” women 
might start working as soon as they drop out of the sample, or they might never return to their 
job during the maternity leave period of 36 months. Under both extreme assumptions the 
results are robust.
41 
  To summarize, additional specifications confirm that the less hazardous the guaranteed 
job and the more flexible the working schedule, the shorter the maternity leave. The following 
section concludes and provides recommendations for a policy designed to allow mothers to 
better reconcile work and family. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This study is, to my knowledge, the first to directly estimate mothers’ MWP for job-
related amenities. Its identification strategy relies on statutory maternity leave, exploiting the 
idea that maternity leave is expected to be shorter the higher the wage and the better the non-
wage aspects of the job a mother is guaranteed while being on leave. The focus of this study 
lies on Germany, where mothers are entitled with the most generous maternity leave (36 
months).  Using  data  from  the  German  Socio-Economic  Panel  and  the  Qualification  and 
Career Survey, I first estimate the impact of wages and amenities on the choice of maternity 
leave  length  by  a  discrete  duration  method  that  assumes  a  logistic  hazard  function  and 
lognormal heterogeneity. I can then derive the MWP for amenities by taking the ratio of the 
elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to a specific amenity over the elasticity with respect 
to the wage. 
                                                            
41 Estimation results using the two, under extreme assumptions, extended samples are available upon request. 29 
The suggested framework of this study contributes to the existing methodologies to 
measure the MWP. In contrast to previous studies (Gronberg and Reed, 1994 and Bonhomme 
and Jolivet, forthcoming), which look at job tenure of male workers and hence, fall short in 
observing all job offers made to the workers, the current approach allows me to overcome the 
limitations of modeling an explicit wage/disamenity offer process. In the case of maternity 
leave,  all  relevant  alternatives  available  to  mothers  while  being  on  leave  are  observable: 
staying at home or returning to the guaranteed job at some point during the 36 month period. 
The job guarantee, implied by the maternity leave, is thus the key component of my strategy 
to estimate mothers' MWP.  
This  study  provides  furthermore  knowledge  about  the  relevance  of  different  job 
aspects for mothers' labor force participation decision. Understanding mothers' preferences for 
certain job characteristics might show us how to pave the way back into the labor force for 
mothers. Given that mothers represent an enormous unused work potential (47% of young 
mothers are not  working in  the OECD),  an efficient  family policy design could  alleviate 
problems arising due to the ageing of society, which is a trend faced by many industrialized 
countries. 
The results of this study show that not only wages but also other non-wage aspects are 
important  determinants  of  mothers  work  decision  and  reveal  the  following  concrete 
information  about  mothers’  preference  for  job-related  amenities.  Hazards,  such  as  health 
risks, are highly avoided by mothers: they are willing to sacrifice 19.9% of their wage to 
improve their working conditions by one standard deviation. Distinguishing in the analysis 
between mothers' financial and educational background reveals that mainly high-income and 
high-educated  women  as  well as  women with  a high-educated partner,  are willing to  cut 
wages in favor of safer workplaces. In other words, only mothers who can either afford to 
choose their job according to personal preference or who are aware of potential consequences 
of menial jobs display a significant MWP to avoid  job-related hazards. The working schedule 30 
is  pivotal  for  mothers  when  deciding  how  long  to  stay  at  home  after  childbirth.  A  non-
standard schedule seems to be attractive for recent mothers; they are willing to accept severe 
wage  cuts  to  be  able  to  work  during  the  evening  (44.2%)  or  in  rotating  shifts  (54.7%). 
Examining differences between East and West Germany demonstrates that only West German 
mothers  exchange  wages  for  this  type  of  working  schedule.  This  result  suggests  that  the 
source of the high MWP for an unorthodox working schedule lies in institutional differences: 
the  lack  of  child  care  facilities  in  West  Germany  might  trigger  a  higher  MWP  to  work 
according to this unusual schedule.  
  Last, the findings of this study allow me to attach a monetary value to every job 
characteristic and, hence, to establish a ranking of occupations according to the price mothers 
would be willing to pay to enjoy the involved amenities. In other words, this ranking provides 
us with some intuition about the most family-friendly jobs. In terms of the flexible working 
schedule,  occupations  like  retail,  specialized  nursing  or  air  controlling,  offer  the  most 
adequate schedules for mothers. With respect to the working conditions, working in retail 
seems again to be the most adequate job for a young mother. Likewise, hotel clerks and 
laywers, for instance, enjoy a very pleasant working atmosphere. Taking the payment into 
consideration as well, occupations such as editors, gynecologists or high school teachers seem 
to be the professions that pay the most, in both monetary and non-monetary terms. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Summary statistics of occupational characteristics 
VARIABLE  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev  Min  Max 
Ln real gross wage  1404  2.3091  0.4922  0.0182  3.6162 
Hazards  1404  10.5600  11.1743  0  100 
Workload  1404  39.8958  14.2908  0  95 
Working hours  1404  35.1045  11.2334  0  70 
Work in the evening  1404  0.2058  0.4045  0  1 
Night work  1404  0.0897  0.2859  0  1 
Shift work  1404  0.1396  0.3467  0  1 




Table 2a: Occupations ranked in a descending order according to their level of disamenities 
Rank  Hazards  Workload 
1  plastic worker (100)  plastic worker (100) 
2  agronomist (65)  glass producer (80) 
3  chemistry lab worker(65)   agronomist (75) 
4  glass producer (60)  industrial engineer (70) 
5  industrial engineer (60)  animal breeder (68) 
6  chemistry worker (57)  nurse (operations) (68) 
7  ceramicist (55)  elderly care (67) 
8  motorcar engineer (53)  horse breeder (65) 
9  warehouse worker (52)  painter/lacquer (65) 
10  carpenter (51)  car lacquer (65) 
Note: I rank the occupation in which the women of the sample (women who are 
eligible for maternity leave) are working in, in a descending order according to 
their level of disamenities. The job on place 1, the plastic industry, exposes its 
workers to the highest amount of environmental hazards, while an agronomist is 
exposed to the second highest amount, etc. In total there are 100 ranks available. 









Table 2b: Level of hazards and workload involved in most common occupations of mothers 










Nurse  2.45  10.61  64.04  33.94  0.52  0.46  0.55 
Bank clerk  2.69  2.19  29.11  37.17  0.19  0.00  0.00 
Sales person  2.12  6.97  48.94  30.82  0.10  0.00  0.12 
Medical secretary  2.25  6.10  43.09  33.25  0.10  0.03  0.20 
Sectretary  2.41  2.17  23.42  36.46  0.12  0.03  0.06 
Educator  2.31  16.67  53.17  37.38  0.41  0.12  0.18 
Retail clerk  1.89  6.62  44.29  38.47  0.27  0.03  0.15 
Hairdresser  1.57  11.55  43.37  35.56  0.00  0.00  0.09 
Office clerk  2.03  2.15  23.14  37.02  0.03  0.00  0.03 
Dental assistant  2.12  12.76  41.67  33.44  0.06  0.00  0.13 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the personal and occupational characteristics 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Age  1404  30.8697  4.5734  18  46 
Partner (in %)  1404  0.9330  0.2500  0  1 
Education (in years)  1404  12.0007  3.1835  1  18 
West (in %)  1404  0.8027  0.3981  0  1 
East (in %)  1404  0.1880  0.3909  0  1 
Other income sources  1404  32449  17413  0  219528 
Low income  1404  0.2457  0.4307  0  1 
Intermediate income   1404  0.3618  0.4807  0  1 
High income   1404  0.3832  0.4863  0  1 
Technology (in %)  1404  0.0548  0.2278  0  1 
Service (in %)  1404  0.6218  0.4851  0  1 
Manufacturing (in %)  1404  0.1510  0.3582  0  1 
Agriculture (in %)  1404  0.0071  0.0841  0  1 
Public admin. (in %)  1404  0.0776  0.2677  0  1 




Table 4: Duration of the maternity leave – Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
 
 
Table 5: Binary relation between the disamenities and the total leave length 
Leave in months  <6  7-12  13-24  25-36 
Spells  197  245  450  512 
Frequency in %  0.14  0.17  0.32  0.36 
Ln real gross wage  2.3840  2.3789  2.3041  2.2513 
Hazards   9.3313  9.2750  11.1495  11.1295 
Workload  38.2271  39.6250  40.5249  40.1145 
Working hours(+overtime)  35.7086  34.4367  35.3400  34.9775 
Work in the evening  0.2234  0.2571  0.2467  0.1387 
Night work  0.1015  0.1102  0.1089  0.0586 
Shift work  0.0863  0.2122  0.1511  0.1152 
Note: The table above shows raw data: for four different leave lengths windows (0-6 months; 
7-12  months,  13-24  months  and  25-36  months)  the  mean  of  job  characteristics  of  the 
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4    Working
5 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Ln gross wage  0.481***  0.554***  0.681***  0.705***  0.683*** 
  (0.0981)  (0.122)  (0.145)  (0.147)  (0.146) 
  [0.0109]  [0.0119]  [0.0118]  [0.0126]  [0.0123] 
           
Hazards  -0.016***  -0.014***  -0.0135**  -0.0136**  -0.0134** 
   (0.00518)  (0.00522)  (0.00655)  (0.00665)  (0.00656) 
  [-0.0004]  [-0.0003]  [-0.0002]  [-0.0002]  [-0.0002] 
            
Workload  0.00375  0.00424  0.00367  0.00349  0.00361 
  (0.00380)  (0.00386)  (0.00492)  (0.00500)  (0.00494) 
  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001] 
           
Working hours  -0.00260  -0.00609  -0.00613  -0.00611  -0.00594 
   (0.00363)  (0.00380)  (0.00446)  (0.00453)  (0.00448) 
  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001]  [-0.0001] 
           
Work evenings  0.261**  0.242*  0.301*  0.314**  0.304** 
  (0.126)  (0.128)  (0.154)  (0.157)  (0.155) 
  [0.0064]  [0.0056]  [0.0058]  [0.0062]  [0.0061] 
           
Night work  0.0352  -0.111  -0.204  -0.211  -0.209 
  (0.172)  (0.176)  (0.208)  (0.211)  (0.208) 
  [0.0008]  [-0.0023]  [-0.0033]  [-0.0034]  [-0.0035] 
           
Shift work   0.306**  0.313**  0.372**  0.370**  0.367** 
  (0.129)  (0.132)  (0.157)  (0.160)  (0.158) 
  [0.0077]  [0.0076]  [0.0074]  [0.0076]  [0.0076] 
           
Rho  0.06044**  0.06415**  0.19266**  0.2080***  0.1970*** 
  (0.02557)  (0.028385)  (0.039845)  (0.039769)  (0.040834) 
           
Constant  -4.854***  -5.858***  -6.057***  -6.483***  -6.200*** 
  (0.318)  (1.602)  (2.036)  (1.941)  (1.916) 
            
Observations  28587  28587  28587  28587  28587 
Note: The coefficients are from a discrete logistic duration estimation with frailty (log-normal 
distributed individual permanent residual). Standard errors are in parentheses: *significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% . Marginal effects are displayed in brackets. Note 
furthermore, rho is the coefficient of the individual time-invariant error term. 
1 Model 1: no further controls are included 
2 Model 2: Additional controls: partner, age, age squared, education, further births, region & income 
3 Model 3: Additional controls, besides the ones in model 2 are average occupational wage growth as 
well as sector, month and year dummies 
4 Model 4: I use log(t) for the baseline hazard  




Table 7: Marginal willingness to pay for amenities associated with work 
 

























0.5468**  0.2563 
Note: The above displayed coefficients for the MWP for 
certain  amenities  are  calculated  according  to  equation 
(8) using the estimated coefficients shown in column 3 
















Table 8a: MWP to avoid hazards for mothers from different income and education groups 
  MWP to avoid 




MWP to avoid 













-0.0181  0.0253  -0.0135 
 
(0.0139)  (0.0328)  (0.0216) 
Intermed. group 
-0.0199  -0.0265**  -0.0190** 
 
(0.0165)  (0.0132)  (0.0129) 
High group 
-0.0246  -0.0772**  -0.0595** 
 
(0.0167)  (0.0403)  (0.0326) 
Note:  Using  the  results  of  a  discrete  logistic  duration  estimation  with  lognormal  frailty  including 
interaction terms between the job characteristics and the income group or the education respectively, I 
can calculate the displayed MWP for certain amenities according to equation (8). Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis below. The results of the discrete duration model are available upon request. The 
income  groups  are  created  according  to  the  income  thresholds  of  the  maternal  benefit  payment 
described in Section 3. The educational levels correspond to the three school tracks offer in Germany; 




Table 8b: MWP for the working schedule distinguishing between East and West Germany 
  MWP for West Germany  MWP for East Germany 
Working hours  -0.0129**  0.0334 
  (0.0064)  (0.0225) 
Evening Work  0.5373**  -0.5589 
  (0.2469)  (0.5307) 
Shift Work  0.5433**  0.4529 
  (0.2528)  (0.5197) 
Note: Using the results of a discrete logistic duration estimation with lognormal frailty including interaction 
terms between the region and the job characteristics, I can calculate the displayed MWP for certain amenities 
according to equation (8). Standard errors are shown in parenthesis below. The results of the discrete duration 
model are available upon request.   
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    Table 9a: Comparison of job characteristics previous and posterior to maternity leave 
  Job characteristics 
previous to leave 
Job characteristics  
posterior to leave 
Ln real gross wage  2.4278  2.3708 
Hazards  8.8015  9.3647 
Workload  39.7026  39.7704 
Working hours  35.7102  27.2039 
Work in the evening  0.2602  0.2504 
Night work  0.1138  0.1008 
Shift work  0.1396  0.1463 
Note:  Column 1 shows the characteristics reported by a woman before going on leave and column 2 
the ones reported by a mother conditional on having come back to work. The sample sizes is thus 
restricted to the women who are returning to work and whose job characteristics are observed both 
previous and posterior to maternity leave. 
 
Table 9b: MWP for disamenities in the different years of maternity leave 
 
  MWP for year 1  MWP for year 2  MWP for year 3 
Hazards 
-0.0217  -0.0219  -0.0238 
 
(0.0103)  (0.0104)  (0.0125) 
Work evenings 
0.3490  0.3522  0.3827 
 
(0.2290)  (0.2306)  (0.2648) 
Rotating shifts 
0.5401  0.5451  0.5923 
 
(0.2464)  (0.2487)  (0.3004) 
Note: The table above is based on the results of a discrete duration estimation with lognormal frailty 
including interaction terms of the wage with dummies for each of the three years of maternity leave. 
Using equation (8) I can calculate the MWP for each amenity but depending on the year after giving 
birth. Standard errors are shown below in parenthesis. The results of the discrete duration model are 
available upon request. 
 